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Note, Requiring Notice of the Right to Apply for
Asylum: Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese
Michael Newman*
In the Refugee Act of 1980,' Congress declared, "it is the his-
toric policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of
persons subject to persecution in their homelands." 2 The objective
of the Act was to "provide a permanent and systematic procedure
for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanita-
rian concern."3 The Act was significant in three respects. First, it
provided statutory acknowledgement of the legal concept of asy-
lum.4 Second, the Act brought United States' law into conformity
with international law by requiring the Attorney General to with-
hold deportation of aliens in certain circumstances.5 Finally, the
Act expanded the statutory definition of refugee to include victims
of persecution from all areas of the world.6
* B.S., University of Wisconsin-La Crosse (1987); J.D., University of Minne-
sota (1990).
1. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C. (1988)).
2. Id. § 101(a).
3. Id. § 101(b).
4. Id. § 201(b) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988)). This section
reads:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physi-
cally present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry,
irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien
may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if
the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee.
Id. Although United States law previously had given statutory recognition as refu-
gees to those aliens who met the restrictive criteria set forth in section 203(a)(7) of
the 1965 Amendments to 8 U.S.C., no prior statute had acknowledged an alien's
universal interest in seeking asylum to avoid persecution. Immigration and Nation-
ality Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 (1965)
[hereinafter referred to in text as INA Amendments of 1965] (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a)(7) (1965) (amended 1980)); see infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text;
Note, Protecting Aliens From Persecution Without Overloading the INS: Should Il-
legal Aliens Receive Notice of the Right to Apply for Asylum?, 69 Va. L. Rev. 901,
901-02 (1983).
5. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
6. Id. The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the definition of "refugee" to include:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
... and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or un-
willing to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
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In Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 7 the district court examined
the significance of the above provisions and concluded they evi-
denced a congressional intention to provide aliens with notice of
their eligibility to apply for asylum.8 The court also found the pe-
titioning class of Salvadoran aliens had a protected interest in that
notice of which could not be deprived without due process. 9
The court's holding in Orantes-Hernandez is consistent with
the decisions of two district courts.' 0 Three United States Courts
of Appeals, however, have found no such right existed."1
This Note examines the district court's holding in Orantes-
Hernandez v. Meese in light of the conflict among federal courts
regarding the right of deportable12 aliens to be notified of their eli-
gibility to apply for asylum. Part I surveys the legislative history
of the relevant provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980 and how that
history has been interpreted by the courts.13 Part II analyzes pre-
Orantes-Hernandez case law and examines whether notice is a
protected liberty or property interest of which a deportable alien
cannot be deprived without due process.14 Part III discusses the
district court's holding in Orantes-Hernandez.15 In Part IV, the au-
thor concludes the district court's application of the Mathews v. El-
dridge'6 balancing formula is appropriate and effective as a
flexible safeguard against national origin discrimination by the Im-
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.
§ 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1980)). This definition replaced the
more restrictive standard of section 203(a)(7) of the INA Amendments of 1965. See
infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
7. 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
8. Id. at 1506 ("Notification of the right to apply for asylum and for relief from
deportation is mandated by the Refugee Act.").
9. Id. at 1506-08.
10. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Orantes-Hernandez v.
Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
11. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984); Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745
F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984); Duran v. INS, 756 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1984).
12. Courts have distinguished between deportable and excludable aliens. An
excludable alien is one who has not formally "entered" the United States. Christo-
pher Yukins, The Measure of a Nation: Granting Excludable Aliens Fundamental
Protections of Due Process, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1501, 1504 (1987). Entering has been in-
terpreted as coming to the United States free from official restraint and having
evaded examination or inspection at the border. Id. at 1504-05 n.13.
A deportable alien, whether having entered legally or illegally, has been ac-
corded due process protection. Id. at 1505. Excludable aliens, on the other hand,
have been afforded only those protections mandated by statute. Id. The term "en-
try" is defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(13) (1988).
13. See infra notes 18-98 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 123-138 and accompanying text.
16. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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migration and Naturalization Service (INS).17
I. Legislative History of the Asylum and Withholding of Deportation
Provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980
Prior to 1980, refugees obtained admission to the United
States pursuant to one of two statutory provisions. Section
212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act' 8 authorized
the Attorney General to parole aliens into the United States.19 Be-
tween 1952 and 1980, thousands of aliens were paroled pursuant to
section 212(d)(5), with the largest concentrations coming from
Hungary,20 Cuba,2 1 and Indochina.22 After 1965, refugees also en-
tered the United States under section 203(a)(7) of the Immigration
and Naturalization Amendments of 1965.23 Section 203(a)(7) au-
thorized the entrance of a maximum of 10,200 refugees per year
under a newly created seventh preference category. 24 To qualify
for admission under section 203(a)(7), an alien was required to be
from a Communist-Bloc or Middle East country and "unable or
unwilling to return to such country or area on account of race,
17. See inAfra notes 139-201 and accompanying text.
18. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1988)).
19. Id. § 212(d)(5) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1952) (amended 1980)).
This section provided: "The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the
United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent
reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for
admission to the United States." Id. Section 212(d)(5) originally was enacted to au-
thorize the parole of aliens unable to meet the stringent entry requirements of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. See, e.g., Deborah Anker & Michael
Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19
San Diego L. Rev. 9, 15 (1981). There were no numerical limitations on the Attor-
ney General's parole power. See Arthur Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980
Refugee Act: An UnfuWlled Promise, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 243, 245 (1984).
20. Between 1956 and 1958, 31,870 Hungarian refugees were paroled into the
United States. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., U.S. Immigration Law & Policy: 1952-1979 18 (Comm. Print 1979) [herein-
after Refugee Policy Report]. Subsequent legislation allowed those refugees to ad-
just their status to permanent residents. Id.
21. Between 1961 and 1979, more than 600,000 Cubans entered the United
States as parolees. H.R. Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979) [hereinafter
H.R. 2816 Report].
22. Between 1968 and 1980, 290,075 Indochinese refugees were paroled into the
United States. Helton, supra note 19, at 248 (figure compiled from Schmidt, Devel-
opment of United States Refugee Policy, INS Rep., Fall 1979, at 1-3; World Refugee
Crisis: The International Community's Response, Report to the Committee on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1979)).
23. Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
§ 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 (1965).
24. Id.
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religion, or political opinion."2 5
The proliferation of executive branch emergency parole pro-
grams26 and the ideological and geographic limitations of section
203(a)(7) led Congress in 1977 to begin hearings on the enactment
of a comprehensive refugee bill.27 In 1979, a series of amendments
to the Immigration and Naturalization Act were introduced in the
House28 and Senate29 as the Refugee Act of 1979. Following hear-
ings and debates, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 198030 and
President Carter signed it into law.3 1
A. Section 201(a)(42): Definition of Refugee
As noted above, prior to 1980, only aliens from designated
countries could apply for asylum in the United States.3 2 The word
"asylum" itself was not used in United States immigration law
prior to 1980.33 As originally proposed, a refugee was defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of his nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which he last habitually resided, and who is unable
or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country because of persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group,
or political opinion.3 4
25. Id. To qualify for relief under section 203(a)(7), aliens were required to
prove that:
(i) [B]ecause of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any Communist or
Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country
within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or un-
willing to return to such country or area on account of race, religion,
or political opinion, and (iii) are not nationals of the countries or areas
in which their application for conditional entry is made.
Id. An application pursuant to section 203(a)(7) could be made only through an im-
migration officer in a noncommunist or noncommunist-dominated country. Anker
& Posner, supra note 19, at 18; see 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(a) (1989).
26. See supra notes 18-22.
27. See, e.g., Anker & Posner, supra note 19, at 33-42; see generally Elizabeth
Hull, Without Justice for All: The Constitutional Rights of Aliens 115-19 (1985).
28. S. 643, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 4863 (1979).
29. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 4816 (1979).
30. The bill passed in the House by a margin of 267 to 192. 126 Cong. Rec. 4508
(1980). The bill was adopted unanimously in the Senate. 126 Cong. Rec. 3758
(1980).
31. Refugee Act of 1980: President's Statement On Signing S. 643 Into Law, I
Pub. Papers of Jimmy Carter: 1980-81 503 (March 18, 1980).
32. See, e.g., Cheryl Edwards, Political Asylum and Withholding of Deporta-
tion: Defining the Appropriate Standard of Proof Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 21
San Diego L. Rev. 171, 175 (1983).
33. See Note, supra note 4, 901 n.5; S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1979) [hereinafter S. 643 Report].
34. The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 643 Before the Comm. on the Judici-
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The definition of refugee proposed in section 201(a) essentially
mirrored that of Article I of the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees,3 5 to which the United States
acceded by becoming a signatory to the 1967 United Nations Proto-
col relating to the Status of Refugees 36 in 1968.37
During committee hearings on the Act, witnesses suggested
improvements for the proposed definition.3 8 Both House and Sen-
ate committees adopted amendments incorporating those sugges-
tions.39 The resulting definitions were substantially different. The
Senate definition included displaced persons,40 while the House
definition included persons still within their own country and ex-
cluded persons who participated in the persecution of any person
ary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74 (§ 201(a) (1979)) [hereinafter S. 643 Hearings]. The
Refugee Act of 1980: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees and International Law of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5-6 (§ 201(a)) (1979) [hereinafter H.R. 2816 Hearings].
35. July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
36. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter
1967 Protocol].
37. Article I of the 1951 Convention defines "refugee" as any person who:
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such
fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his for-
mer habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
1951 Convention, supra note 35, at 152.
38. In the Senate Hearings, Ingrid Walter, Chair, Committee on Migration and
Refugee Affairs of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, stated:
We would hope the Congress will be able to find a mechanism which
would permit victims of natural disasters to be admitted to the United
States as refugees in those relatively infrequent, yet nonetheless com-
pelling circumstances, when returning to their homes or when finding
new homes elsewhere is not possible.
S. 643 Hearings, supra note 34, at 51-52.
During the House Hearings, David Carliner of the ACLU observed that "[t]he
definitions of the statute don't now require that a person make his application
within a third country, but in fact it would be impossible for a person in a country
where he is suffering persecution to be precleared, screened, or processed by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service." H.R. 2816 Hearings, supra note 34, at
187. Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum of Amnesty International criticized
"the omission from the term 'refugee' of any reference to displaced persons or de-
tainees who may reasonably fear persecution while still within their own country."
Id. at 169. Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman queried Michael Egan, Associate
Attorney General, why, unlike the 1967 Protocol, persons who engaged in persecu-
tion were not excluded from the definition. Id. at 71.
39. S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 23226 (1979); S. 643 Report,
supra note 33, at 20 (§ 101(a) (42)); H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec.
37199 (1979); H.R. 2816 Report, supra note 21, at 38, (§ 101(a) (42)).
40. S. 643. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 23226 (1979); S. 643 Report,
supra note 33, at 20 (§ 101(a) (42) (B)).
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"on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion."41 The conference committee
adopted the House definition of refugee with the proviso that per-
sons persecuted within their own country would be considered ref-
ugees only if so designated by the President in "special
circumstances."42
Statements from the Act's sponsors and witnesses at the com-
mittee hearings make clear that the final definition of "refugee"
was intended to be equitable and nondiscriminatory. As noted in
the Senate Report, the definition "repeals the current immigration
law's discriminatory treatment of refugees by providing a new def-
inition of refugee that recognizes the plight of homeless people all
over the world."43 The new definition was intended to eliminate
the "geographical and ideological restrictions" which existed under
the former definition.44
B. Section 208: Asylum Procedure
As originally introduced, the Refugee Act contained no direct
reference to asylum nor did it provide any direction regarding how
the proposed refugee provision 45 would be administered. During
hearings in the Senate46 and the House,47 witnesses objected to
these omissions. In addition, some witnesses recommended the
right to apply for political asylum, in and of itself, should be in-
cluded in the Act.48
41. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 37199 (1979); H.R. 2816 Re-
port, supra note 21, at 38 (§ 101(a)(42)(B)) (emphasis added).
42. S. 643, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. 3570 (1980); Refugee Act of
1980: Conference Report, S. Rep. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (§ 201) (1980) [here-
inafter Conference Report].
43. S. 643 Report, supra note 33, at 1.
44. Id. at 4.
45. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
46. Ingrid Walter, Chair, Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs of the
American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, objected to the pro-
posed legislation because it "does not provide for uniform procedures relating to
the granting of asylum to and proscribing deportation or return or [sic] refugees to
countries where they have a fear of persecution. Indeed the very concept of asylum
is missing from the bill." Id. See S. 643 Hearing, supra note 34, at 52.
47. A number of witnesses at the House hearings objected to the lack of a spe-
cific procedure. David Carliner of the ACLU noted that "[a]lthough the right of
asylum has been regarded as an historic tenet of American political policy, it has
not been set forth in any statutory provision." H.R. 2816 Hearings, supra note 34,
at 186. Wells Klein, Senior Vice Chair, Committee on Migration and Refugee Af-
fairs, proposed the addition of a provision that stated "[t]he Attorney General shall
establish a uniform procedure for an alien, regardless of his status, applying for asy-
lum who is physically present in the United States, and shall admit any such alien
for lawful permanent residence who meets the definition of a refugee." Id. at 250.
48. Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum of Amnesty International stated
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The Senate49 and House 5O committees responded to these
criticisms by amending the bill to require that the Attorney Gen-
eral establish a uniform procedure for considering asylum applica-
tions.5 ' Under the proposed House provision, the decision to grant
orderly asylum status would be left to the Attorney General even
if an alien met the definition of refugee.52 The House Report
stated the provision was included to "insure a fair and workable
asylum policy which is consistent with this country's tradition of
welcoming the oppressed of other nations and with our obligations
under international law."53 In contrast, the Senate provision
mandated a person be accorded asylum if she met the definition of
refugee.54 The Senate Report suggested the procedure set up by
the Attorney General "include a provision allowing all asylum ap-
plicants an opportunity to have their claims considered outside a
deportation and/or exclusion proceeding, provided the order to
show cause has not been issued."55
"[w]hile it may not be appropriate to spell out in detail the procedures under which
an alien may claim asylum, the right to apply for political asylum should be in-
cluded within the terms of the legislation." H.R. 2816 Hearings, supra note 34, at
170. David Carliner of the ACLU testified that "[m]any people in this situation
have been granted what we call asylum under the parole authority of the Attorney
General. I believe it would be useful to include this as a substantive right in the
provisions of the statute setting forth the procedures relating to applications for
asylum." Id. at 188.
49. See S. 643 Report, supra note 33, at 9.
50. See H.R. 2816 Report, supra note 21, at 17.
51. The Senate Committee version stated:
The Attorney General shall establish a uniform procedure for an alien
physically present in the United States, irrespective of his status, to
apply for asylum, and the alien shall be granted asylum if he is a refu-
gee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) and his deportation or
return would be prohibited under section 243(h) of this Act.
S. 643 Report, supra note 33, at 26 (§ 207(b)(1)) (emphasis added). The House com-
mittee version stated:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physi-
cally present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry,
irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien
may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if
the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within
the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A).
H.R. 2816 Report, supra note 21, at 44 (§ 208(9)) (emphasis added).
52. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 37199 (1979); H.R. 2816 Re-
port, supra note 21, at 44 (§ 208(a)); see, e.g., Richard Preston, Asylum Adjudica-
tions: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and US.
International Obligations?, 45 Md. L. Rev. 91, 102-03 (1986).
53. H.R. 2816 Report, supra note 21, at 17.
54. S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 23226 (1979); S. 643 Report,
supra note 33, at 26 (§ 207(B)(1)); see, e.g., Richard Silver, Will INS v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca Affect the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Review of Asylum and Withholding
of Deportation Cases?, 10 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 197, 221 (1988); INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 441, 441-42 (1980).
55. S. 643 Report, supra note 33, at 9.
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The House-Senate Conference Committee adopted the House
committee's version of the bill.56 As passed, section 208 is substan-
tively identical to Article 34 of the 1951 Convention, which pro-
vides that the "[c]ontracting [s]tates shall as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees."5 7 In
neither provision is the implementing authority mandated to ac-
cept persons who meet the definition of refugee.58
C. Section 243(h). Withholding of Deportation
Senator Edward Kennedy, the sponsor of the Senate bill, S.
643, noted the proposed legislation would "make our law conform
to the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees."5 9 The 1967 United Nations Protocol 60 incor-
porated the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 6 '
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention declared, "[n]o Contracting State
shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatso-
ever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion."62 Under
the proposed section 243(h), however, the Attorney General would
be authorized to withhold deportation of an alien to any country
"where such alien's life or freedom would be threatened on ac-
count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion."6 3 Thus, the decision to deport or
accept a refugee would be left to the discretion of the executive
branch.
A number of witnesses criticized the discrepancy between the
mandatory nature of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and
the discretionary nature of proposed section 243(h).64 Such criti-
56. S. 643, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. 3571 (1980); Conference Report,
supra note 42, at 20.
57. 1951 Convention, supra note 35, at 176; see Silver, supra note 54, at 221; INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987).
58. See 1951 Convention, supra note 35, at 176; see also Silver, supra note 54, at
221; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441.
59. S. 643 Hearings, supra note 34, at 2.
60. 1967 Protocol, supra note 36.
61. 1951 Convention, supra note 35.
62. Id. at 176. (emphasis added).
63. S. 643 Hearings, supra note 34, at 82-83.
64. A. Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum observed:
Despite the mandatory nature of the United States' obligations under
international law, the language of section 243(h) is merely permissive
... and also makes no distinction between refugee-asylees and other
aliens. The suggested language is not in conformity with the require-
ments of the Convention and Protocol and is inconsistent with the his-
toric policy of the United States "to respond to the urgent needs of
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cism was based on the fear that the executive branch would abuse
its discretion and exclude politically undesirable aliens.65 In re-
sponse, both the Senate6 6 and House6 7 committees amended sec-
tion 243(h) to make withholding of deportation mandatory. The
House-Senate Conference Committee adopted the House version
of section 243(h).68
The legislative history of the Refugee Act is silent on the spe-
cific question of whether Congress intended notification to accom-
pany the right of asylum and withholding of deportation created
by sections 208 and 243(h).69 Congress' intent to aid refugees in a
nondiscriminatory fashion, however, pervades the Act.70 As Sena-
persons subject to persecution in their homelands" which is set forth
in Title I of the Act.
Amnesty International would therefore strongly urge that section
243(h) be amended to require the Attorney General to withhold depor-
tation or return of any refugee who falls within the new definition of
that term in section 201(a) of the proposed legislation.
HR. 2816 Hearings, supra note 34, at 169.
65. At the Senate Committee hearings, Ingrid Walters, Chair, Committee on
Migration and Refugee Affairs of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies,
stated, "we believe that alternative language should be used in section 243(h) to put
that section more in conformity with the UN Convention and Protocol, we suggest
the following: The Attorney General shall not deport." S. 643 Hearings, supra note
34, at 52 (emphasis added).
During the House Committee hearings, A. Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Han-
num of Amnesty International stated that such an amendment "would underscore
and emphasize domestically the United States' obligation to find a safe refuge for
legitimate political refugees rather than to permit the Attorney General, for
whatever reasons, to return them to a country where they face persecution." HR
2816 Hearings, supra note 34, at 169.
66. Section 243(h), as amended by the Senate committee, stated:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to any
country where such alien's life or freedom would be threatened on ac-
count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion unless deportation or return would be
permitted under the terms of the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees.
S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 23227 (1979); S. 643 Report, supra note
33, at 29.
67. Section 243(h)(1), as amended by the House committee, stated:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than
an alien described in section 241(a)(19)) to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or. political opinion.
H.R. 2816," 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 37200 (1979); H.R. 2816 Report,
supra note 21, at 47.
68. S. 643, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. 3572 (1980); Conference Report,
supra note 42, at 7.
69. Note, supra note 4, at 908 ("At best, the Refugee Act's legislative history is
ambiguous on the question of whether Congress intended the INS to give all aliens
notice of the right to apply for asylum.").
70. Mary Jane LaPointe, Discrimination in Asylum Law: The Implications of
Jean v. Nelson, 62 Ind. L.J. 127, 139 (1986) ("The historical evidence leaves little
Law and Inequality
tor Kennedy observed, "[t]his legislation will ... insure greater eq-
uity in our treatment of all refugees." 71
D. Judicial Interpretation of the Refugee Act of 1980
Courts that have addressed the question have disagreed
whether notification is mandated by the Refugee Act of 1980. Two
district courts required notification.
In Nunez v. Boldin,72 a class of Guatemalan and Salvadoran
detainees requested a temporary injunction requiring the INS to
notify detainees of their right to apply for political asylum. 73 The
district court found that the INS had not advised detained aliens of
their right to apply for political asylum prior to voluntary depar-
ture74 nor prior to the issuance of an order to show cause.7 5 The
court observed that the INS' failure to notify rendered the 1967
Protocol and Refugee Act of 1980, as well as the intent behind
them, ineffective. 76 The court concluded:
What is obvious to the [c]ourt at this point is that the United
States has, by treaty, statute, and regulations, manifested its
intention of hearing the pleas of aliens who come to this coun-
try claiming a fear of being persecuted in their homelands.
The intention is not necessarily stated as granting the privilege
of asylum to all who come to this country but of hearing those
pleas.77
Accordingly, the Nunez court issued a temporary injunction re-
quiring the INS to notify Salvadoran and Guatemalan detainees of
doubt that Congress intended all provisions of the 1980 Act to be free of invidious
discrimination."); Michael Nelson, Halting a National Sacrilege: Aliens Should Be
Given Notice of Their Right to Apply for Political Asylum, 9 Loy. L.A.L. Comp.
L.J. 81, 91 (1986) ("Congress' desire to help ,'refugees is manifest throughout the
Act.").
71. 126 Cong. Rec. 3756 (1980) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
72. 537 F. Supp. 578 (1982).
73. Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at 578-79. Plaintiffs were detained at the INS detention
facility at Los Fresnos, Texas. Id. at 580.
74. If an alien establishes that she is willing and has immediate means to depart
from the United States promptly, an immigration judge may authorize the alien to
depart voluntarily from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) (1988).
75. Under current procedures, the asylum application may be filed with the dis-
trict director provided the order to show cause has not been issued. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.3(a) (1989); see Orantes-Herandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 376 (C.D. Cal.
1982). Asylum requests made after the institution of exclusion or deportation pro-
ceedings must be filed with the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1989).
Formal deportation proceedings are commenced by the filing of an order to
show cause with the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1989). At that time,
the alien is informed of her right to free legal services and her right to remain si-
lent. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) (1989).
76. Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at 584.
77. Id.
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their right to apply for political asylum in the United States. 78
In Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith,7 9 Salvadoran aliens filed for
class certification and for a preliminary injunction against speci-
fied practices of the INS, including coercing aliens to sign volun-
tary departure forms without advising them that they could apply
for political asylum.8 0 Considering the plaintiffs' contention that
the Refugee Act of 1980 required the INS to notify class members
of their right to apply for political asylum, the court observed that
"congressional desire to provide assistance to deserving refugees is
apparent throughout the Act." 81 The court rejected the INS' argu-
ment that sufficient notice was afforded by the issuance of the or-
der to show cause, because if aliens depart voluntarily, they are
afforded no procedural protection.82 The court concluded the INS
procedure of having aliens sign voluntary departure forms without
being notified of their right to apply for asylum frustrated the in-
tent behind the Refugee Act of 1980.83
Three United States Courts of Appeals, however, have found
that notification is not required to effectuate congressional intent.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Jean v. Nelson,s4 concluded that because
Congress made no direct reference in the Refugee Act of 1980 to a
notice procedure, that right could only be required if it were inher-
ent in the establishment of the asylum procedure itself.8 5 The
court did not find this to be the case because "Congress provides
many opportunities to the people of this country without requiring
the government to publicize their availability."8 6 In Ramirez-
78. Id. at 587.
79. 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 374; see Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80
Colum. L. Rev. 1125, 1131-32 (1980).
82. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. at 375-76. The court noted that
under current INS regulations, an asylum request made after the institution of ex-
clusion or deportation proceedings is also considered a request for withholding pur-
suant to section 243(h). Id. at 375; see 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1989).
The court observed that "[t]he order to show cause brings with it the proce-
dural protection of the right to counsel and the right to remain silent." Orantes-
Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. at 376. However, the court noted that none of
these protections is of any use to "the class member who departs voluntarily with-
out ever hearing that asylum might be available." Id.
83. Id.
84. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984).
85. Id. at 982.
86. Id. The court noted that "[i]t has never been held, for example, that the
government must inform individuals that they have the right to sue the govern-
ment for tort claims, or the right to seek educational loans or public assistance."
Id.
Indeed, the court observed, such a requirement might actually serve to frus-
trate Congressional intent to preserve aliens with a well-founded fear of persecu-
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Osorio v. INS,87 the Fifth Circuit considered whether the INS, in
all deportation proceedings, must inform each alien of her right to
petition for asylum.8 8 The court found section 243(h) was essen-
tially a conforming amendment rather than one that affirmatively
required notice.8 9 The court relied on the testimony of David
Crosland, Acting Commissioner for the INS, who had stated that
aliens, "are interviewed as to why they came here. If they have
questions that would flag asylum claims such as fear of persecution
upon being returned ... those persons are told what their rights
are."90 Since the INS notifies an alien of her right to petition for
asylum if it appeared she might be persecuted, the Ramirez-Osorio
court concluded the INS procedures were reasonable and consis-
tent with Congressional intent.91 In Duran v. INS., 92 deportation
proceedings were instituted against two Philippine citizens.93 Hav-
ing admitted deportability at a hearing, they were granted volun-
tary departure. 94 Rather than departing, however, one filed a
motion to reopen the deportation proceeding, charging he had not
been informed of his right to asylum.95 Finding Ramirez-Gonzalez
v. INS 96 controlling, the Ninth Circuit held that pursuant to
C.F.R. section 242.17,97 notice of the right to asylum is required
tion since "[i]f the volume of asylum claims rises significantly, the INS may feel
compelled to rely more and more on group profiles and less on individual evidence
and credibility." Id. at 983 (quoting Note, supra note 4, at 924).
87. 745 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984).
88. Jose Irene Ranirez-Osorio and Jose Ismael Rubio, citizens of El Salvador,
were detained after entering the United States. Id. at 938. Both were ordered to
appear before an immigration judge at the Los Fresnos Service Processing Center
in Texas and ordered to show cause why they should not be deported. Id. Neither
expressed a fear of persecution upon returning to El Salvador. Id. at 939.
89. Id. at 943. The court concluded "[t]he amendment neither changed the
measure of entitlement to asylum nor the placement of the responsibility for mak-
ing that decision." Id.
90. Caribbean Migration: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigra-
tion, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1980) (statement of David Crosland) (quoted in Ramirez-
Osorio, 745 F.2d at 941-42 n.6).
91. Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 944-45.
92. 756 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit originally found that notice
was required. Brief for Defendant at 20, Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp.
1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988). The INS petitioned for en banc rehearing. Id. On April 2,
the original decision was withdrawn and a new decision was issued. Id.
93. 756 F.2d at 1339. Deportation proceedings were instituted against Leonillo
and Shirley Duran. Id. Both had overstayed their visas. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 695 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1983). In Ramirez-Gonzales, the court found that 8
C.F.R. § 242.17(c) did not, by its terms, require notice of the right to apply for asy-
lum. Id. at 1212.
97. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1989) states "[tihe immigration judge shall inform the
respondent of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits enu-
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only when the special inquiry officer, rather than the alien,
designates the country to which the alien will be deported.98
Thus, while two district courts found notice mandated by the
Refugee Act, no circuit court has reached a similar conclusion.
The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have been unwilling to ex-
tend the right of asylum to include notification.
II. Due Process
The Supreme Court has held due process protections apply to
deportable aliens.99 The Court has recognized a deportation hear-
ing involves "issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in
the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned,
perhaps to life itself."100 The due process clause applies, however,
only if a government action will deprive an individual of a life, lib-
erty, or property interest.' 0 1 After a protected interest is impli-
cated, "the question remains what process is due."'10 2
Examining whether an asylum applicant had a protected in-
terest, the district court in Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti 10 3
noted that "[i]n a very graphic sense, the political asylum applicant
who fears to return to his homeland because of persecution has
raised the specter of truly severe deprivation of life, liberty, and
property: in this case, harassment, imprisonment, beatings, torture
and death."l0 4 In Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 0 5 the Fifth
Circuit considered a class action filed by 4,000 Haitians seeking
merated in this paragraph and shall afford the respondent an opportunity to make
application therefor during the hearing."
98. Duran, 756 F.2d at 1341. The court observed that 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1989)
provides that the special inquiry officer shall inform aliens of their apparent eligi-
bility to apply for asylum or withholding. Id. Unless the petitioner puts informa-
tion before the judge to make such eligibility "apparent," this duty does not come
into play. Id. (quoting United States v. Barreza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 222 (9th Cir.
1978)).
99. In The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903), the Court noted
"this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that admin-
istrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of
persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in due process of
law." In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1977), the Court observed "there are liter-
ally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The fifth amend-
ment, as well as the fourteenth amendment, protects every one of these persons
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Id. at 77.
100. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
101. Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak & J. Nelson Young, 2 Treatise on Con-
stitutional Law: Substance and Procedure 202 (1986).
102. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
103. 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
104. Id. at 455.
105. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
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political asylum.106 The court found that section 208 and the regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to it, in conjunction with section
243(h) and the 1967 Protocol, demonstrated a clear congressional
intent to create, "at a minimum, a constitutionally protected right
to petition our government for political asylum." 0 7 The court did
not address whether notification was included within the contours
of this right.
In Nunez v. Boldin, the district court confronted the question
of whether notification of the right to asylum was necessary to sat-
isfy the requirements of due process.i 08 Citing Civiletti, the Nu-
nez court concluded, "[tihe interest of an alien with the same fear
[as an asylum applicant] is no less simply because, not knowing he
has the right, he has not filed an application for asylum."' 0 9
The Nunez court further observed that notification had been
required in a number of other due process contexts."10 The court
applied the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. El-
dridge."' The Mathews test balanced three factors to determine
what process was due: the private interest of the individual, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest pursuant to the cur-
rent procedures and the value of additional safeguards, and the
burden that would be imposed on the government by the addi-
tional requirement." 2 The Nunez court found that the detainee's
106. Id. at 1026.
107. Id. at 1038; see David Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National
Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 165, 187 (1983) ("At
least since enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, the federal legal provisions gov-
erning asylum claims fit this mold rather well, and justify a conclusion that the ap-
plicant's interest amounts to 'property' or 'liberty' under the Supreme Court's
rules.").
108. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
109. Id. at 584; see Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 455 (S.D.
Fla. 1980).
110. The court relied on Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1281 (7th Cir. 1981)
(court required notice to housing project tenants of their right to receive retroac-
tive housing benefits) and Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 62 (3rd Cir. 1980) (court
required notice to a debtor not only of an attempt to garnish an account, but also
notice of legal exemption to which she might be entitled). Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at
584.
111. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
112. Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at 586. The exact wording of the Court provides for
consideration of three factors:
[Flirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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interest was not to be returned to a country where he feared per-
secution or death.113 The court stated the current INS procedures
did not assure that genuine asylum claims would be heard and con-
cluded notice would remedy this deficiency."l 4 Examining the ad-
ditional administrative and financial burden entailed, the court
reasoned that notifying detainees of their right to apply for asylum
was an insignificant imposition.115
In Jean v. Nelson, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the holding
in Nunez, finding the Refugee Act of 1980 did not create any sub-
stantive interest in notification.116 The court held that while the
Supreme Court has recognized some statutorily created substan-
tive entitlements, in this case the dispensation of the benefit was
clearly at the discretion of the INS and thus no protected interest
was created. 117
In Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, the Fifth Circuit rejected the peti-
tioners' request that the INS be required in all deportation pro-
ceedings to inform each alien of his or her right to petition for
asylum.1 8 Examining the petitioners' claims that they were de-
prived of a constitutionally protected interest, the court found
that, even assuming such an interest existed, the resulting due pro-
cess requirements did not include a right to notification. The court
refused to read Finberg and Holbrook as broadly as the Nunez
court.1 9 Noting that a counterbalance of administrative necessity
was conspicuously absent from those cases,120 the court refused to
provide a blanket notice.' 2 ' The court concluded there was "no ba-
sis for discounting the INS judgment that it would generate such
large numbers of frivolous claims as to imperil its purpose."122
Thus, prior to Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, only the district
113. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
114. Id. The court observed that a "majority of detainees are completely unedu-
cated as to INS procedures. They do not speak the English language, nor can they
read the English language asylum application required for consideration." Id. at
586.
115. "The [c]ourt is of the opinion, however, that... [the possibility of unworthy
claims] does not override the need for those with worthy claims to have them
heard." Id. at 586.
116. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 981-82 (11th Cir. 1984).
117. Id. at 981. The circuit court considered the impact of § 243(h). Id. at 981
n.33. It found "this provision does not create a substantive entitlement to asylum,
but simply to relief from deportation to that country." Id.
118. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944-47 (5th Cir. 1984).
119. See supra notes 103-07 (Nunez court discussing right to political asylum).
120. Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 946.
121. The court pointed out that in both Holbrook and Finberg the costs associ-
ated with providing notice were minimal. Id. A requirement of blanket notice,
however, would result in an increase in meritless claims. Id.
122. Id.
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court in Nunez found notification was necessary to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process. Neither the Fifth nor the Eleventh
Circuit was willing to interpret the respective provisions of the
Refugee Act of 1980 so expansively.
III. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese
In Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese,123 the district court consid-
ered whether the INS should be required to issue permanently the
so-called "Orantes advisal" notifying Salvadorans of their right to
asylum.124 The court noted that a substantial number of
Salvadorans who flee El Salvador possess a well-founded fear of
persecution and that human rights abuses are suffered by a cross-
section of Salvadoran society.125 The court further observed that
the vast majority of Salvadorans who are apprehended sign volun-
tary departure 2 6 agreements that commence a summary removal
process. Thus, Salvadorans are deprived of a deportation hearing,
the only forum in which they could seek political asylum and with-
holding of deportation.127 These voluntary departure agreements
were procured by the INS from Salvadorans by using numerous
coercive techniques, including outright threats and
misrepresentations.128
The Orantes-Hernandez court found that in light of the coer-
cive practices of the INS, the intent of the Refugee Act can only be
effectuated by giving Salvadorans notice of their right to apply for
asylum. 29 Distinguishing Jean v. Nelson, the district court stated
that although Congress provides many opportunities without re-
quiring the government to publicize their availability, few opportu-
123. 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
124. Id. at 1506-08.
125. Id. at 1491. The court noted a substantial number of Salvadorans who flee
El Salvador and enter the United States have a good faith claim to asylum. Id. The
types of persecution include: arbitrary arrest, torture including use of electric
shock, beatings, rape, "disappearances," extra-judicial executions, abductions,
threats against family members, forced ingestion of food, false imprisonment, sleep
deprivation, mass killings, and forced relocation. Id. at 1492.
126. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988) that provides, in part:
[I]n the discretion of the Attorney General, and under such regula-
tions as he may prescribe, deportation proceedings, including issuance
of a warrant of arrest, and a finding of deportability under this section
need not be required in the case of any alien who admits to belonging
to a class of aliens who are deportable under section 1251 of this title if
such alien voluntarily departs from the United States at his own ex-
pense as hereinafter authorized.
Id. (emphasis added).
127. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1506.
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nities arise in circumstances as perilous as those in which
Salvadorans find themselves. 3 0
The district court in Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith had not
considered plaintiff's argument that the Refugee Act confers a
statutorily protected interest in notice of asylum that could not be
deprived without due process. 13 ' In Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese,
however, the court addressed this issue and found that withhold-
ing of deportation is a "separate interest which is jeopardized by
the administrative voluntary departure process." 3 2 To resolve the
due process issue, the court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge bal-
ancing test.133 Applying the first part of the test, the court found
that "the right to a deportation hearing and the various rights as-
sociated therewith, including the right to apply for political asy-
lum, constitute a substantial liberty interest."x34 The court also
found the INS pattern of encouraging Salvadorans to accept volun-
tary departure and discouraging them from applying for political
asylum made the likelihood of deprivation great.135 The court
noted the representation relied on in Ramirez-Osario, that INS of-
ficials were flagging likely successful asylum applicants, simply
was not true in the case of Salvadorans.136 Finally, the court
found that furnishing notice of the right to seek political asylum
imposed no substantial burden on the government. 137
The court distinguished Ramirez-Osorio, noting that Rami-
rez-Osorio dealt only with the issue of blanket notice for all aliens.
While the Ramirez-Osorio court found such a blanket notice would
impose a substantial burden on the government, the Orantes-Her-
nandez court concluded the burden was outweighed by the
Salvadorans' interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation. The
court observed, "[t]he calculation of the Mathews balancing test
could be quite different for other nationalities." 38
IV. A Flexible Standard for Preventing INS Discrimination
The district court in Orantes-Hernandez rejected a blanket
notice requirement and, instead, endorsed a flexible method for as-
certaining whether congressional intent was effectuated and
130. Id.
131. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 378 n.33 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("it
is not necessary to employ this form of due process analysis").
132. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. at 1506.
133. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
134. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. at 1507.
135. Id.




whether due process was satisfied. In both cases, the court's in-
quiry focused on the nature and extent of the discrimination
against the alien class. Using this framework, Orantes-Hernandez
v. Meese not only assails INS national origin discrimination but
also takes into consideration the difficulties of administering no-
tice to all aliens.
A. INS Discrimination
Although the definition of refugee in section 201(a)(42) of the
Refugee Act of 1980139 appears to be ideologically neutral, in prac-
tice the INS has continued to favor aliens from those nations
which were given preferential status under section 203(a)(7) of the
INA Amendments of 1965.140 Whether or not an alien receives
asylum is more often determined by the relationship between the
home country and the United States than by the facts of his or her
individual case. 141 Eastern European and Soviet emigr4s face
lower standards in establishing not only threat severity' 42 and
specificity 43 but also motivation.144
State Department participation also serves to politicize the
asylum process. For each asylum application, the State Depart-
139. See supra note 6.
140. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
141. See Hull, supra note 27, at 121-22; Christopher Hanson, Behind the Paper
Curtain Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
107, 124-26 (1978); Sophie Pirie, The Need for a Codified Definition of "Persecu-
tion" in United States Refugee Law, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 187, 200-07 (1986); Helton,
supra note 19, at 243-54; LaPointe, supra note 70, at 142-43. These commentators
are supported by the asylum application statistics compiled by the government for
1984:
Applications Pending Received Granted Denied
Afghanistan 589 153 263 269
Bulgaria 33 10 19 13
Czechoslovakia 139 55 51 72
El Salvador 13,501 5,455 503 13,045
GDR 19 15 18 3
Hungary 276 78 82 160
Rumania 318 159 192 246
INS, 1984 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 77-78
(Table Ref. 3.3).
Thus, while in Afghanistan nearly an equal number of applications in 1984
were granted as were denied, in El Salvador twenty-six times as many applications
were denied as were granted.
142. Pirie, supra note 141, at 202-04 ("As a general matter, aliens from commu-
nist-controlled countries face lenient threat content and severity requirements.").
143. Id. at 204-05 ("Threat specificity plays an important role in persecution de-
terminations because strict threat specificity requirements can deny protection to
potential victims of random attacks on a defined social group.").
144. Id. at 205-07. Many Eastern European and Soviet emigr6s face more lenient
political motivation requirements. Id. at 206.
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ment's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
(BHRHA) provides the INS with an advisory opinion.1.45 In the-
ory, the BHRHA operates separately and independently from the
heavily politicized country embassy and desk officer stations.14 6 In
practice, however, the BHRHA relies on information provided by
the embassy outposts and country desk officers. 147 Thus, the advi-
sory opinions bias the asylum process against refugees from
friendly nations.148
The treatment of Salvadoran aliens provides one of the most
vivid illustrations of the biases in operation. As one commentator
observed, "[i]f the United States were to acknowledge that Salva-
doran aliens were political refugees under our Refugee Act's stan-
dard of proof, it would be openly admitting that the current U.S.
policy in El Salvador is flawed."1 49 The State Department Coun-
try Reports continue to paint El Salvador as a country with an im-
proving political climate and few problems with human rights
abuses.1 50 The picture presented by Amnesty International and
the Organization of American States (OAS), however, is quite dif-
ferent.' 5 ' In addition, El Salvador remains one of only five coun-
tries where the United Nations has established a procedure for
particularized reporting on human rights violations.' 5 2
The specific conduct of the INS also demonstrates this bias.
Aliens from El Salvador were informed that "Salvadorans do not
get asylum"' 5 3 or that only guerrillas or soldiers can qualify for
145. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1989).
146. See Pirie, supra note 141, at 212; Hanson, supra note 141, at 134.
147. See Pirie, supra note 141, at 213; Hanson, supra note 141, at 134-35.
148. See Hull, supra note 27, at 122.
149. Pamelia Barnett, United States Political Asylum for Salvadoran Refugees:
A Continuing Debate, 8 Hous. J. Int'l. L. 131, 141 (1985); see Leonel Gomez, The
Politics of Salvadoran Refugees in 7 In Defense of the Alien 151-55 (1985).
150. The State Department reported that in El Salvador, "[a]lIthough flawed, the
security forces' human rights record has improved substantially since the early
1980's." Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1988,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (Joint Committee Print 1989).
151. Amnesty International reported that, during 1988, "[t]here was increased ac-
tivity by so-called 'death squads', which the government said were outside their
control but which were widely alleged to be composed of police and military per-
sonnel operating both in uniform and in plain clothes." Amnesty Int'l Report 1989,
at 120. They noted that the death squads were responsible for abductions, "disap-
pearances," and politically motivated killings of suspected opponents of the govern-
ment. Id. OAS reported that, in 1989, the commission was informed of numerous
summary executions of persons supposedly connected with the government. OAS,
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1988-1989, at
166 (1989).
152. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
153. Id. at 1495.
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asylum.154 Even after the INS was required to notify Salvadorans
of their right to apply for asylum,155 the government failed to do
so in a substantial number of cases.156 In addition, INS agents con-
tinued to engage in threats and misrepresentations in coercing
Salvadorans to sign voluntary departure agreements. 157
B. INS Discrimination and Congressional Intent
National origin discrimination by the INS frustrates the in-
tent of the Refugee Act of 1980. Upon introducing the Act in the
House, Representative Holtzman noted, "[t]he bill before the
House today will .. . mandate equity in our treatment of all refu-
gees; it will bring us into conformity with our international legal
obligations." 5 8 The disparate treatment of Salvadoran aliens is in
contravention of the spirit of equality and non-discrimination that
pervades the Act.
In addition, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, upon which much of the Refugee Act of 1980 was based,
mandates nondiscrimination. 159 Article 3 of the 1951 Convention
states, "[t]he [clontracting [sitates shall apply the provisions of this
Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion
or country of origin."16o The United Nations observed that "[t]he
Convention is based on two principles: (1) that there should be as
little discrimination as possible between nationals, on the one
hand, and refugees, on the other; and (2) that there should be no
discrimination based on race, religion or country of origin among
refugees."161
By becoming a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, the United
States substantively committed itself to a policy of nondiscrimina-
tion among refugees.162 Congress codified that commitment into
United States law by modeling the Refugee Act of 1980 around the
154. Id.
155. In Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, the court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring the INS to notify aliens that they had a right to be represented by an at-
torney, a right to a deportation hearing, a right to apply for political asylum, and a
right to request voluntary departure. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp.
351, 387-88 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
156. Plaintiffs' Post Trial Reply Brief at 447, Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F.
Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
157. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. at 1494.
158. 125 Cong. Rec. 35813 (1979) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzan).
159. See, e.g., LaPointe, supra note 70, at 137-39; Hull, supra note 27, at 118.
160. 1951 Convention, supra note 36, at 156.
161. U.N., The United Nations and Human Rights 69 (1984) (emphasis added);
see LaPointe, supra note 70, at 137-38; U.N. Charter; Article 55 of Charter art. 55.
162. See, e.g., LaPointe, supra note 70, at 138.
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1967 Protocol.16
The Supreme Court, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 164 stated:
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new def-
inition of "refugee," and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that
one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States
refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.165
The court in Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese recognized that INS dis-
crinination against Salvadorans frustrated the Act's intent.
C. INS Discrimination and Due Process
1. Liberty or Property Interest?
The district court's finding that notice to Salvadorans is an in-
terest protected by due process is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. The Supreme Court has found in a number of cases
that petitioners had a sufficient interest in specific benefits to re-
quire due process notice. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co. ,166 the Court examined the sufficiency of a New York law that
required only notice by publication.167 The Court held that, with
regard to known beneficiaries, a more extensive form of notice is
warranted to conform with the requirements of due process.16 8 A
later case, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,169 drew
on the analysis in Mullane and found the property interest of mu-
nicipal utility recipients was substantial enough that the service
could not be terminated without notification of a procedure for
challenging disputed bills.170 In each of the above cases, the Court
determined potential recipients could not be deprived of benefits
without due process.
The district court in Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese relied on
many of the considerations the Supreme Court had relied on in
Mullane and Memphis. The Court in Memphis based its determi-
nation, in part, on the lack of sophistication of those likely to re-
ceive the benefit. The Court observed, "this skeletal notice did not
163. See id.
164. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
165. Id. at 436.
166. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
167. Id. at 308-09 (the state of New York only provided notice by publication to
beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common trust
fund); see, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 913.
168. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-19. The Court found that "[t]he statutory notice to
known beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but
because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who
could easily be informed by other means at hand." Id. at 319.
169. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
170. Id. at 13-15; see, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 913.
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advise them of a procedure for challenging the disputed bills....
such notice may well have been adequate under different circum-
stances . . . here, however, the notice is given to thousands of
customers of various levels of education, experience, and re-
sources." 171 Similarly, in Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, the district
court examined the potential Salvadoran applicants' frequent illit-
eracy and lack of understanding of asylum procedures.172 The
court concluded, "the evidence establishes that many Salvadorans
do not know of the right to asylum before they come to the United
States."173
The Supreme Court has recognized that state or federal laws
can create substantive entitlements to government benefits which
warrant constitutional protection as "liberty" or "property" inter-
ests.174 In a number of cases in which the Supreme Court ex-
amined statutory language similar to 243(h), the Court found a
liberty or property interest existed. In Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co.,175 the Court held the failure of the Illinois Fair Em-
ployment Practices Commission to comply with a statute that
stated, "[w]ithin 120 days of the proper filing of a charge, the Com-
mission shall convene a fact finding conference," deprived the
claimant of a property right.176 The Court concluded, "[w]hile the
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest.., it may
not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest,
once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards." 177
In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmatesl7s and Board of
Pardons v. Allen,179 the Court examined state parole statutes that
mandated parole unless the parole board determined an inmate
failed to satisfy certain conditions.1 80 In both cases, the Court
found the statutes created a protected interest although the parole
was, to a large degree, at the discretion of the parole boards.181
The Court in Allen found that "[s]ignificantly, the Montana stat-
171. Memphis, 436 U.S. at 15 n.15; see Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 945 (quoting
Memphis, 436 U.S. at 15 n.15); Note, supra note 4, at 913.
172. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1507 (C.D. Cal. 1988); see,
e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 913.
173. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. at 1507.
174. See Jean v. Nelson, 957, 727 F.2d 981 (11th Cir. 1984).
175. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
176. Id. at 427, 433 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 911.
177. 455 U.S. at 432 (quoting Vitel v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490-91 n.6 (1980).
178. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
179. 482 U.S. 369 (1989).
180. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Allen, 482 U.S. at 380-81; see, e.g., Note, supra
note 4, at 909.
181. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Allen, 482 U.S. at 380-81; see, e.g., Note, supra
note 4, at 909.
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ute, like the Nebraska statute [considered in Greenholtz], uses
mandatory language ("shall") to creat[e] a presumption that parole
release will be granted."'18 2 Section 243(h), like the parole statutes
in Greenholtz and Allen, mandates an action once the factfinder
has made an "inherently subjective and predictive" decision.18 3
In Jean v. Nelson, the Eleventh Circuit discounted the argu-
ment that section 208 created a substantive entitlement, conclud-
ing that dispensation under that provision was clearly
discretionary. 8 4 Likewise, in Ramirez-Osorio, the Fifth Circuit
characterized section 243(h) as a conforming amendment which
created no substantive entitlement.l8 5 In Allen, however, the
Supreme Court rejected an analogous argument that parole stat-
utes did not constitute a protected interest simply because of the
discretionary nature of the provision. 8 6 The Court cited its deci-
sion in Hewitt v. Helms,187 in which it observed:
[P]etitioners argue, with considerable force, that these terms
must be read in light of the fact that the decision whether to
confine an inmate to administrative segregation is largely pre-
dictive, and therefore that it is not likely that the State meant
to create binding requirements. But on balance we are per-
suaded that the repeated use of explicit mandatory language in
connection with requiring specific substantive predicates de-
mand a conclusion that the state has created a protected lib-
erty interest.ls
The Supreme Court has recognized that statutes which allocate a
benefit chiefly at the discretion of the administrator can still cre-
ate a protected liberty or property interest if phrased in
mandatory language.
2. What Process Is Due?
In Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, the district court adopted an
analysis for distinguishing what process is due among nationalities
pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge. By this method, the behavior of
the INS itself is a factor that may influence whether a nationality
is accorded notification.
Application of the Mathews test requires the court balance
three factors. On the side of aliens, two factors are considered: (1)
182. Allen, 482 U.S. at 377.
183. See id. at 381 (noting that the Court in Greenholtz recognized that parole-
release decision is inherently subjective and predictive).
184. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 981 (11th Cir. 1984).
185. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 945 (5th Cir. 1984).
186. Allen, 482 U.S. at 377-78.
187. 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (Court examined inmate segregation statute).
188. Id. at 472.
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the importance of the liberty or property interest at stake; and (2)
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the opportunity to apply for
asylum and the extent to which the risk can be reduced by notifi-
cation. 8 9 On the government's side, the court must measure the
governmental interest in avoiding the increased administrative and
fiscal burdens which result from increased procedural
requirements.190
Under the analysis in Orantes-Hernandez, aliens have a sub-
stantial liberty interest in their claims for political asylum and re-
lief from deportation regardless of their nationality. Although it
has been suggested that aliens' personal interests be discounted be-
cause they compose the "outermost ring of membership" in the na-
tional community by virtue of their complete absence of prior
community affiliation,191 an objective evaluation of aliens' stakes
results in a measure that is, indeed, extremely high.192 An alien
wrongfully denied an opportunity to apply for asylum faces incar-
ceration, torture, or death. The Supreme Court recently noted, in
dicta, that "[d]eportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the
more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or
she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his
or her home country."193 In this context, few individuals have a
higher interest at stake.
The fulcrum of the Orantes-Hernandez analysis is the flexi-
bility of the second Mathews factor. In measuring the likelihood of
erroneous deprivation, the district court emphasized three charac-
teristics unique to Salvadorans: (1) many Salvadorans are totally
ignorant of the concept of asylum;194 (2) a substantial number of
class members have bona fide claims to asylum or withholding;195
and (3) the voluntary departure procedure used by the INS jeop-
ardized the ability of the Salvadorans to seek asylum and with-
holding of deportation.196 With respect to other nationalities, these
three factors may or may not be present.
In the case of Salvadorans, the INS' use of voluntary depar-
189. See Rotunda, supra note 101, at 265.
190. See id.
191. Martin, supra note 107, at 216. Martin suggests "levels" of community
membership which should be taken into consideration in evaluating an alien's in-
terest: (1) citizens; (2) lawful permanent residents; (3) applicants for admission. Id.
at 208-16.
192. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties" A
Response to Martin, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237, 248-49 (1983).
193. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
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ture agreements as well as their repeated misrepresentations and
outright threats to Salvadoran aliens greatly increases the likeli-
hood of erroneous deprivation. The likelihood of erroneous depri-
vation would not be as great in the case of nationalities which have
not been the subject of such hostile treatment. Indeed, some na-
tionalities specifically have been treated more favorably. Aliens of
a number of nationalities have been granted "extended voluntary
departure" status permitting them to remain within the United
States even if deportable by law.197 In addition, the INS currently
has a policy of according "sensitive handling" to aliens from four-
teen communist countries.198
The last factor, the administrative and financial burden the
notice requirement imposes on the government, is also fixed under
the Orantes-Hernandez analysis. Unlike the blanket requirement
rejected in Ramirez-Osorio, notice limited to the class of detained
Salvadorans does not present the danger of substantially burden-
ing the government with asylum claims.199
By adopting a flexible approach to deciding what process is
due, the district court accurately applied the Mathews balancing
test. The difficulty of the district court's analysis is that it necessi-
tates judicial fact-finding with respect not only to INS procedures
toward aliens of each respective nationality but also to each coun-
try's political climate.200 In light of the severity of the conse-
quences resulting from INS discrimination, however, this added
judicial burden is a small price to pay.
V. Conclusion
Upon convening the Hearings on the Refugee Act of 1980 in
the House, sponsor Elizabeth Holtzman observed:
There is a broad consensus that our refugee policy up to this
time has been haphazard and inadequate . . . [i]n good mea-
sure, our country's humanitarian tradition of extending a wel-
come to the world's homeless has been accomplished in spite
of, not because of, our laws relating to refugees.201
197. Brief for Plaintiff at 423, Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488
(C.D. Cal. 1988). Since 1960, nationals from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Czecho-
slovakia, Chile, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Iran, Nicaragua,
Uganda, Poland, Afghanistan and Mexico have been granted this status. Id.
198. Id. at 425. The countries are East Germany, Rumania, Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Cuba, Albania, the People's Republic of China,
North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Id.
199. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. at 1508.
200. Brief for Plaintiff at 357, Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488
(C.D. Cal. 1988).
201. H.R 2816 Hearings, supra note 34, at 1.
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Although Congress was for the most part silent regarding the ex-
tent of the right to asylum and withholding provided by sections
208 and 243(h), the spirit of nondiscriminatory aid to refugees per-
vades the Act. In addition, adherence to the 1967 Protocol as codi-
fied in the Refugee Act of 1980 requires notice be given to aliens
unlikely to be apprised of that right. The district court in Orantes-
Hernandez properly found the treatment of Salvadoran refugees
ignored congressional intent.
A number of courts have fashioned a due process right to asy-
lum. By measuring on a case-by-case basis the likelihood of an
alien's erroneous deprivation of this interest, the district court in
Orantes-Hernandez adopted a flexible standard for determining
whether notification is required. This application not only creates
an incentive for the INS to treat refugees in an equitable fashion,
it also creates a flexible safeguard for protecting the right of aliens
to asylum.
